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ABSTRACT
Phishing has become one of the most recognized words associated with cybercrime. As more
organizations are being targeted by phishing campaigns, there are more options within the
industry to deter such attacks. However, there is little research into how much damage these
campaigns are causing organizations. This paper will show how financial organizations can be
impacted by phishing and present a method for accurately quantifying resultant monetary losses.
The methodology presented in this paper can be adapted to other organizations in order to
quantify phishing losses across industries.
Keywords: phishing, cybercrime, economics

INTRODUCTION
The cybercrime referred to as ‘phishing’ is a
social engineering attack used by the criminal
to lure the victim into divulging information.
These attacks typically employ spammed
emails and fraudulent websites to obtain the
information. The information collected by
these attacks can be used in identity theft, to
remove funds from a customer account, and in
theft of online resources [12].
The number of phishing attacks reported
by various researchers and organizations is
continuing to rise; however, the associated
losses appear widely divergent. For instance,
industry security company RSA reported that
in 2013 there were nearly 450,000 phishing
websites that accounted for $5.9 billion in
estimated losses [9]. Interestingly, RSA
reported that in 2012 there were around
445,000 phishing websites that accounted for
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$1.5 billion in estimated losses [10]. Note that
over this period of one year there was an
increase of only 5,000 phishing websites and
yet a substantial rise in estimated losses of
$4.4 billion. Gartner Research reported in 2008
that over 3.6 million Americans alone lost an
average of $886 per phishing attack in 2007 [6].
Using these numbers, it was approximated that
there was an estimated loss of $3.2 billion.
Other researchers claim that the estimated
losses in 2007 caused by around 113,000
phishing websites was approximately $61
million [5]. Given the lack of proper resources
currently invested by organizations into antiphishing strategies and research, the estimated
loss of billions of dollars is unlikely. However,
the question remains: how much does phishing
cost organizations? Organizations understand
that phishing is a problem, yet many do not
measure what that loss is to the economic
bottom line.
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In order to accurately measure phishing it
is important to understand that the number of
phishing websites targeting an organization
may not directly relate to the amount of
money lost by that organization. Furthermore,
the organization with the highest volume of
phishing websites does not necessarily have the
highest volume of customers visiting phishing
websites. While PayPal is often deemed the
most targeted organization using phishing URL
volume [1] [4], it is yet to be determined which
companies’ customers visit the most phishing
websites and perhaps lose the most
information.
In addition, the phishing URL volume is a
poor measurement of distinct phishing attacks
because some phishing groups use dynamic
machine names and URLs to redirect all traffic
to the same phishing website. Consequently,
thousands of phishing websites that appear to
be unique attacks should actually be
considered one attack. This mitigates the
effects of blacklisting as well as some takedown
efforts. Exact URL matches are required to
take action and the multitude of dynamic
machine names and URLs impedes blacklisting
and overwhelms takedown queues [1].
Phishing is an ecosystem problem and thus
needs to be properly handled by the entire
industry. Phished information may be reused
against other organizations, so data collected
by phishers from social networking phishing
websites may also be used to attempt logins on
email and financial accounts.
The antiphishing community has ensured that some
safety nets can be deployed such as browserbased blacklisting, which will prevent potential
victims from visiting phishing websites in the
browser [14]. In addition, methods of email
authentication such as DMARC often prevent
phishing emails and URLs from reaching
customers. DMARC was standardized in
March of 2013, and has currently blocked more
Page 210
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than two billion suspicious emails, and covers
greater than 80% of typical US email users [3].
Nonetheless, organizations still need to
understand how phishing attacks targeting
their own organization impact the business’
bottom line.
PayPal recently performed an analysis of
the impact phishing has on its business and
thinks it would be appropriate to share the
methodology with other organizations in the
hope that it will help those organizations
better assess the status of their current
phishing situation. The example numbers and
percentages that follow are based on internal
data and external research and will provide
estimates that reflect the current situation.
The paper’s intent is to present a method that
will allow companies to measure the effect of
phishing on their business. We do not present
empirical data because currently this is
sensitive
information
for
internal
use
exclusively and its omission does not impede
the utility of the method. This paper therefore
prepares financial organizations with starting
criteria to measure the impact of phishing on
their organization. The Different Impacts of
Phishing section presents the various forms of
impact that phishing can have on an
organization.
The Direct Monetary Loss section provides
an equation that can be used by financial
organizations to measure the direct monetary
loss caused by phishing. These same models
can be slightly modified to measure the impact
on other types of organizations such as social
networking, gaming, and identity providers.
The Example Calculations and Results section
presents a scenario that demonstrates how the
equation and variables can be used to obtain
the direct monetary loss. Finally, there is the
Limitations section that describes some of the
limitations to this work and how additional
measures can be taken to obtain more accurate
results.
© 2016 ADFSL
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Figure 1. Example PayPal phishing websites attempting to collect additional information after the
credentials were captured.

DIFFERENT IMPACTS
OF PHISHING
Direct Monetary Loss
Direct monetary loss due to phishing
determines the amount of monetary damage an
organization incurs when its customers’
information is lost. Typically, people think of
phishing as synonymous with acquiring login
credentials;
however,
normal
phishing
campaigns request numerous pieces of
personally identifiable information as observed
in the phishing website screenshots in Figure 1.
Example data that is collected by phishers are
login username and password, first and last
names, credit and debit card numbers, CCV2,
home addresses, and other pieces of
information that can be used to steal a
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person’s identity [2]. Therefore, direct
monetary loss determines how much money it
costs the company to, for example, reimburse
customers for the monetary loss they incur by
losing their information or having their
account compromised.

Operational Costs
Another loss that needs to be considered is the
amount of money an organization spends on
handling phishing attacks. Examples include
but are not limited to:
Takedown efforts
The removal of the phishing content from
domains, phone numbers used in vishing (voice
phishing), and email addresses used as drop
boxes or for spamming. Some organizations
choose to perform takedowns using internal
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resources, while others pay external takedown
companies to handle the phishing campaigns.
For example with 40,000 phishing websites
per year:


Takedown by an external party
costs $35 per website



Takedown operational
$1.4M per year

costs

=

Customer service phone calls
Customers with questions frequently contact
customer service agents about whether a
suspicious email is legitimate or a phish. Such
calls often last much longer than typical
customer service calls as they require the agent
to go through a number of steps to identify
phishing indicators as well as to properly
comfort the customer.
For example with 40,000 phishing websites
per year:


Customer service agents receive $10
per hour



Each call lasts on average 20
minutes



Average of 2 calls per phishing
attack



Customer
service
phone
call
operational costs = ~$267K per
year

Handling incoming customer
emails and feeds
Infrastructure and software is required to
properly handle phishing reported by
customers, researchers, and feeds from industry
in an appropriate manner.
Building anti-phishing
technologies
Building anti-phishing technologies requires
building or buying software capable of
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collecting data on phishing attacks, whether it
is to identify attacks faster, identify the
culprits behind the attack, or develop other
ways
that
organizations
collect
more
information on phishing attacks (e.g. passive
DNS, intelligence feeds, and DKIM bounces).
In addition, building anti-phishing technologies
requires coming up with new industry
standards to prevent phishing such as
DMARC.
Investigations
A significant amount of resources is invested in
third-party or in-house investigative services.

Brand Damage
This variable is typically overlooked when
trying to quantify the monetary impact of
phishing on an organization. Brand damage is
very difficult to determine and predict;
however, there are three important variables
that can help in this calculation.
The first is measuring the number of
customers that leave and/or close their
accounts with the company because they were
phished. An organization would need to
compare their normal attrition rate to the
attrition rate of customers that they can
identify as being phished. The past revenue on
each of those accounts can then be used to
derive the future revenue that was lost on each
account, thus providing some estimate of
brand damage caused by phishing.
The second variable is to look at accounts
that were not closed in response to a phishing
attack, but that experienced a significant drop
in transaction frequency or dollar value. By
measuring the drop, an organization can assess
a level of loss that may be triggered from the
customer losing trust in the brand or in their
ability to safely use the service.
The final variable is the cost to the
organization to gain new customers. An
organization is likely taking a substantial loss
© 2016 ADFSL
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if it has to replace the customers who left due
to phishing with an equal number of new
customers. Unlike the previous two variables
many
organizations
have
marketing
departments that do calculate the cost of
acquiring new customers, but this number has
not generally been used by organizations to
associate with equations on losses due to
phishing or accounts being compromised.

DIRECT MONETARY
LOSS
Direct Monetary Loss
Equation
Of all of the variables presented above,
measuring the direct monetary loss is typically
what the business wants to better understand.
This section provides the variables that can be
used to determine the direct monetary loss
value per year. The equation that can be used
is:
Direct Monetary Loss = numSites x
avgVisit x %Creds x monetized x avgLoss
Where:


numSites is the number of phishing
websites per year



avgVisit is the average number of
customers visiting each website



%Creds is the percentage of valid
credentials
acquired
by
each
phishing website



monetized is the number of
credentials that undergo attempted
monetization



avgLoss is the average amount of
loss due to a compromised account

The following section will describe ways to
obtain the values for each variable. If properly
collected, the data can be used to get within
an order of magnitude of direct monetary loss,
© 2016 ADFSL
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and sometimes even more accurate,
demonstrated in an example below.

as

How to Collect the Data
The first variable, numSites, is probably
the easiest variable to collect. The industry
understands that there are gaps in phishing
data; however, the aggregation of internal and
industry sources can often lead each
organization to a near complete data. More
research would then need to be performed to
determine exact coverage. The additional
research would consist of aggregating data
across a variety of different sources such as
blacklists, security companies, and industry
groups and comparing the aggregate data set
to that collected by the organization. An
organization can use that research to estimate
what their coverage is and use it within the
equation to account for websites that the
organization may have missed.
The second variable, avgVisit, requires
organizations to perform more research. One
method for collecting data on the visits (i.e. by
IP address) to phishing websites is to use
organizational web server logs. Many phishing
websites use the resources (e.g. graphics,
JavaScript files, and CSS files) of the
organization they are phishing to render their
website [11]. In fact, one of PayPal’s internal
feeds identified that over 65% of the phishing
websites use at least one PayPal resource. An
example strategy an organization could employ
is analyzing the web server logs to look for
resources being used on confirmed phishing
websites. The web server logs would provide all
IP addresses that visited the phishing URLs.
This data could be used to calculate the
average number of distinct IPs that visit each
phishing website. But this calculated average
does not necessarily only consist of the number
of customers that visited. Included in this
number are visits by takedown specialists,
security researchers, and other organizations
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such as Google and Microsoft that crawl these
websites over and over again to confirm that
they are malicious (i.e. phishing) and to ensure
they are still active. There are a number of
ways to differentiate customers from the antiphishing communities. One way is to use
WHOIS information to parse out the IP
addresses that are confirmed to be associated
with certain anti-phishing organizations.
Another way is to use only IP addresses that
visit one of the phishing pages per year. We
understand that this may lose a few victims
that are on a shared IP or that some antiphishing communities use cloud services to
visit the pages, but largely, this filter should
work properly. The example in the next section
will back this idea.
The third variable, %Creds, is the
percentage of credentials that were harvested
by the phishing website. Potential victims do
not lose their credentials to a phishing website
just because they visit the web page.
Therefore, this variable calculates the
percentage of victims who lose their legitimate
credentials. %Creds is the hardest variable to
obtain and fully measure without the support
of email providers and law enforcement;
however, there are a number of ways to collect
such information on a smaller scale. The first
method is by collecting “drop files” in which
the phishing websites write the stolen data to a
temporary file in order to store the information
for later retrieval. Analysis of the collected
data can be used to determine the %Creds
variable. Another method is based on the fact
that some phishing websites log the user into
the legitimate organization after the login
credentials are submitted to the phishing
website. This lures users into believing they are
entering their credentials into the proper
website and enables a check of the validity of
the credentials. Organizations can then analyze
the credentials submitted by the phishing
website to the organization’s login page to
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determine the percentage of valid credentials
to invalid credentials. This variable is
important as it allows the organization to
know what percentage of visiting customers
entered legitimate data.
The
monetized
variable
is
also
organizationally dependent. This variable is
used to calculate the number of stolen valid
credentials that the criminals will attempt to
monetize. Organizations can collect the
monetized variable by comparing the number
of accounts of which user credentials are
known to be compromised (through methods
such as detecting account password validation
and unauthorized account access) to the
number of accounts that had advanced
functionalities performed on the account such
as transferring money, changing account
information, and selling goods. Essentially,
there is a major difference between attackers
checking if a password is valid versus actually
trying to monetize the account by making a
transaction. While currently there are no
published numbers by organizations on
monetized variables, observations on internal
and external data suggest that many
organizations consider attempted monetization
on accounts that are harvested to be around
10-20%.
The last variable, avgLoss, allows
organizations of various types to insert their
own measurement of loss to determine the
direct monetary impact that occurs when a
customer’s account is compromised. For
financial institutions, this number may be
derived from the amount of money the
organization has reimbursed a customer or a
merchant because the phished account was
used to make some purchase or transfer
money.

© 2016 ADFSL
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EXAMPLE
CALCULATIONS AND
RESULTS
One interesting result from the use of this
method at PayPal was that variations in the
variables only slightly affected the direct loss
that the organization incurred. The example
scenario below demonstrates how this works.

Example Variables on One
Year of Data


We will continue with the previous
example of 40,000 (numSites)
phishing websites per year.



Of the 40,000 URLs, 60% of the
URLs had IP address data found
within the web server logs. That
means that there are 24,000 URLs
with IP address data. One
limitation to this equation is the
fact that this proportion may not
be representative of the entire data
set. See the Limitations section
below for further discussion.



90,000 IP addresses only visited one
of
the
24,000
URLs.
We
hypothesize that there should be an
insignificant number of phished
customers that visit 2+ phishing
websites and lose data within a
year.



The 90,000 distinct IPs suggests
that the average number of visitors
to each phishing website per year is
3.75 (avgVisit).



In this scenario, which is close in
numbers to internal research, only
96,000 distinct IPs visited one to
four different phishing URLs. The
96,000 would move the avgVisit to
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only 4, which will be demonstrated
to be insignificant.


Finally, the organization’s loss per
set of credentials is set to $40
(avgLoss).

Estimated Yearly Loss
From the data above it is apparent that there
are some values that have been estimated;
however, it can be demonstrated in the results
below that these variations have little effect.
Table 1 shows the direct monetary loss
resulting from the variation in the proportion
of submitted valid credentials (Y-axis) and
monetization (X-axis).
Table 1
Direct losses incurred with IP addresses visiting one
phishing website using variations in the percentage of
valid credentials (y-axis) and percentage monetized (xaxis)

10%

25%

50%

75%

90%

20%

$120K

$300K

$600K

$900K

$1.1M

33%

$198K

$495K

$990K

$1.5M

$1.8M

50%

$300K

$750K

$1.5M

$2.3M

$2.7M

The calculation may be further illustrated
assuming 50% of attacks submitted credentials
and 10% attempted monetization. Along with
the hypothetical inputs above (40,000 websites
x 3.75 average visitors x 50% submitted valid
credentials x 10% attempted monetization x
$40 as value for compromised credential), the
final loss equals $300K.
Even when varying the attempted
monetization, the values do not drastically
increase until levels of 50% and 75% are
attained, which are extreme for large
organizations, but may be realistic for smaller
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organizations who have accounts sold or traded
less often.
Taking into account the IP addresses that
visited phishing websites one to four times
does not strongly affect the overall loss
numbers. Comparing values from Tables 1 and
2 shows that there is only the 0.25 increases in
these values.
Table 2
Direct losses incurred using IP addresses that visited one
to four phishing websites

10%

25%

50%

75%

90%

20%

$128K

$320K

$640K

$960K

$1.2M

33%

$211K

$528K

$1.1M

$1.6M

$1.9M

50%

$320K

$800K

$1.6M

$2.4M

$2.9M

LIMITATIONS
We understand that there are limitations to
the method presented. The first noticeable
limitation is differentiating the customer IP
addresses from anti-phishing and researcher IP
addresses. We stand by our statement that the
chance of the same IP address being used by
multiple customers to visit the same phished
organization from the same phishing site
within a year is insignificant. In PayPal’s
research, we found that there was very little
difference between the number of IP addresses
visiting one phishing website and the number
of IP addresses visiting up to four phishing
websites. Also, we have observed that WHOIS
data analysis can be used to filter out a
substantial number of the anti-phishing IP
addresses.
Another limitation is that the percentage
of URLs of the number of victim IP addresses
visiting phishing websites (60% in the above
example) may not be representative of the
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entire data set. If the data was collected
randomly then it should be accurate. However,
if the data was not collected randomly it will
be slightly less accurate as different attacks
may entice different numbers of users to visit
and submit information. PayPal found that
one security tool was able to collect IP data on
over 60% of its phishing URLs, while another
source of information had greater than 35%
coverage. Organizations should aggregate data
across all tools if possible. If a complete
investigation is needed, an organization can
perform an analysis on the remaining URL
data set with a statistically significant sample.
An example might consist of the organization
requesting the sample size in web server logs
from the web server owners that were hosting
the phishing content. These logs can be parsed
to determine the number of visitors and thus
add to the strength in the variable avgLoss.
A final, major limitation that needs
clarification for the whole industry is
ascertaining the validity of the percentage of
credentials submitted per visitor. Scenarios for
calculating this variable were presented above,
so we will not restate those strategies;
however, we would like to revisit how
collaborative work with email providers and
even law enforcement can greatly assist with
this metric. The anti-phishing community is
well aware that most of the stolen information
is communicated to the phisher using “drop
email addresses” [13] or “drop mail boxes” [8].
These email addresses are collected from
phishing kits by a number of researchers and
security companies [7]. Industry could perform
a large-scale study checking the validity of the
credentials sent to these email addresses from
phishing websites.

CONCLUSIONS
The ultimate goal of this work is to help
organizations better understand how to gauge
the impact that phishing has on its business.
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There are a variety of ways that an
organization is affected by phishing, including
direct monetary loss, operational costs, and
brand damage. Each of these metrics is equally
important when considering the amount of
money that should be invested into
counteracting phishing attacks. In addition to
defining the various ways that phishing can
impact an organization, this paper presents
and details an equation and associate variables
that can be used to measure the direct
monetary loss a financial organization incurs
due to phishing. There are limitations to the
equation and its variables; however, most
organizations do not know if phishing is
costing them thousands, tens of thousands,
hundreds of thousands, or even millions of
dollars. PayPal hopes that the research
presented in this paper will be used by
organizations to better assess the status of
their current phishing situation.
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